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chapter 4

The Reasonable Use Doctrine in
California Water Law and Policy
brian e. gray

The cardinal principle of California water law is that all water rights,
and all uses of water, must be reasonable. This seemingly simple and
innocuous sentence masks a world of meaning and complexity, however, because the requirement of reasonable use embraces at least four
interrelated concepts. The determination of reasonable water use is utilitarian: the law seeks to encourage relatively efficient, economically and
socially beneficial uses of the state’s water resources. It is situational: the
evaluation of individual reasonable use concerns not only the
water right holder’s own uses but also other competing demands (both
consumptive and ecological) on the water resource. The reasonable
use doctrine is also dynamic: the definition of reasonable use varies as
the economy, technology, demographics, hydrologic conditions, environment, and societal needs evolve. And, because all uses of water
must be consistent with this interdependent and variable definition of
reasonable use, the law renders all water rights fragile. A water right
that was reasonable when first recognized, and which may have
been exercised reasonably for many years, may become unreasonable as
hydrologic conditions change, as California’s economy evolves, as
population grows and new demands for water arise, as ecological
needs are better understood, and as the environmental laws that
protect the state’s aquatic ecosystems and native species are applied in
ways that limit the impoundment and diversion of water for consumptive uses.
83
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The doctrine of reasonable use is thus both a policy mandate and a
limitation on water rights. A part of California’s Constitution since
1928, it applies to all branches of government, to all levels of governmental administration of the state’s water resources, and to public and
private uses of the state’s waters. Its overarching directives, comprehensive reach, and infusion into the water rights system make it the most
powerful of all of the laws that govern California’s water resources.1

the constitutional doctrine of
reasonable use
Article X, section 2 of the California Constitution declares that, because
of the state’s hydrologic and economic conditions, the general welfare
requires that its water resources “be put to beneficial use to the fullest
extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable
use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented.” It also stipulates that “the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a
view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the
people and for the public welfare.”2
Article X, section 2 then ties the reasonable use requirement to the
water right itself: “The right to water or to the use or flow of water in
or from any natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be
limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial
use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the
waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.” It concludes with the statement that
the amendment “shall be self-executing, and the Legislature may also
enact laws in the furtherance of the policy in this section contained.”
In one of its early interpretations of article X, section 2, the California
Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental purposes of the doctrine of
reasonable use, explaining in Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935): “The
waters of our streams are not like land which is static, can be measured
and divided and the division remain the same. Water is constantly shifting, and the supply changes to some extent every day. A stream supply
may be divided but the product of the division in nowise remains the
same. When the supply is limited public interest requires that there be
the greatest number of beneficial uses which the supply can yield.”
Three decades later, in a case that presaged the modern era in California water law and policy, the court expressly linked these aspects of
article X, section 2, to the definition of water rights.
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reasonable use and the property
right in water
In Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District (1967), the Supreme Court
rejected the claims of riparian landowners who harvested sand and
gravel deposited by the natural flow of Nicasio Creek for commercial
sale. The landowners alleged that the district violated their water rights
by constructing a dam that impaired the natural flow and thus deprived
them of the suspended materials carried by the water.
The court observed that, to prevail on their damages claim, the Joslins
must “first establish the legal existence of a compensable property interest”
and that such an interest “consists in the right to a reasonable use of the
flow of water.” Although evaluation of reasonable use “depends on the
circumstances of each case,” the court reasoned, “such an inquiry cannot
be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent importance. Paramount among these [is] the increasing need for the
conservation of water in this state, an inescapable reality of life quite apart
from its express recognition in the 1928 amendment.” The court then concluded that the Joslins’ reliance on the unimpaired flow had become unreasonable in light of the new demands for municipal water supply. Moreover, “since there was and is no property right in an unreasonable use [of
water] there has been no taking or damaging of property by the deprivation of such use and, accordingly, the deprivation is not compensable.”
Although Joslin is sometimes read as a simple decision not to countenance a use of water that required an inordinate percentage of the
flow of the stream, a closer reading reveals that the Supreme Court had
broader purposes in mind. The opinion emphasized the utilitarian goals
of the doctrine of reasonable use: to ensure that the state’s water
resources are used in ways that serve the public interest, not just to benefit senior water right holders. Equally importantly, the court focused
on the dynamic nature of the reasonable use inquiry and the consequent
fragility of the property right in water. Water rights are defined by reasonable use, and they are thereby limited by reasonable use. A use of
water that may have been lawful when established—and that continued
to be exercised lawfully for many years—may become unreasonable as
conditions change. Moreover, because the property right in water is
defined by contemporary standards of reasonable use, a water right (or
certain aspects of the right) may cease to exist as a result of changes in
hydrologic, economic, demographic, or environmental conditions that
are well beyond the control of the water right holder.
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reasonable use and water rights
administration
In the years following Joslin, the California courts applied the doctrine
of reasonable use principally to enhance the regulatory jurisdiction of
the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB). In In re Waters of
Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979), the Supreme Court held that
when the board conducts a statutory adjudication of all surface water
rights, it has authority to relegate unexercised riparian rights to a priority below all active uses of water in the system—both riparian and
appropriative.3 In People v. Shirokow (1980), the court ruled that a
nonriparian water user may not claim prescriptive rights outside of the
SWRCB’s permitting and licensing jurisdiction. Both decisions emphasized that the legislature had created the board for the express purpose
of implementing and enforcing the constitutional reasonable use mandates.4 Assertions of previously dormant riparian rights to preempt
valid existing uses and claims to water rights based on prescriptive use
were unreasonable, the court concluded, because they created uncertainty and undermined the SWRCB’s ability comprehensively to administer California’s surface water rights system.
In the wake of Joslin, the California Courts of Appeal also bolstered
the SWRCB’s power directly to enforce the reasonable use doctrine. In
People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board v. Forni (1976), the
court held that the board had authority under Water Code section 275
to enjoin vineyards along the Napa River from diverting water to spray
on their crops during periods of low temperatures to prevent wine
grapes from freezing. The lawsuit was based on the board’s determination that “direct diversion during the frost season may at times dry up
the river and deprive many of the vineyardists of water which they need
to protect their vines from frost” (Cal. Code Regs. Title 23, § 735). The
court affirmed the board’s decision to compel all vineyards—including
those that diverted water pursuant to riparian rights—to construct storage to minimize aggregate demands on the available water. According
to the court, the “overriding constitutional consideration is to put the
water resources of the state to a reasonable use and make them available for the constantly increasing needs of all the people. In order to
attain this objective, the riparian owners may properly be required to
endure some inconvenience or to incur reasonable expenses.”
In Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control
Board (1986, 1990), the court upheld the SWRCB’s finding that the
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Imperial Irrigation District’s unlined canals and lack of regulating reservoirs were causing flooding and waste of water within its service area.
It also rejected the irrigation district’s argument that, as a pre-1914
appropriator, it was not subject to the SWRCB’s regulatory authority. As in Forni, the court held that section 275 conferred independent
jurisdiction on the board to enforce the reasonable use mandates of
article X, section 2. Faced with the prospect of losing a substantial portion of its water rights, the district agreed to a 35-year transfer of more
than 100,000 acre-feet of conserved water each year to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.5
The courts also have affirmed the SWRCB’s assertion of its reasonable use powers to set water quality and flow standards for the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta and to establish operational constraints on
the Central Valley Project, the State Water Project, and other water
right holders as required to protect water quality, fisheries, and other
instream uses in the Delta ecosystem. In United States v. State Water
Resources Control Board (1986), the Court of Appeal again emphasized the multifaceted and dynamic nature of article X, section 2:
We perceive no legal obstacle to the Board’s determination that particular
methods of use have become unreasonable by their deleterious effects upon
water quality. Obviously, some accommodation must be reached concerning
the major public interests at stake: the quality of valuable water resources
and transport of adequate supplies for needs southward. The decision is
essentially a policy judgment requiring a balancing of the competing public
interests, one the Board is uniquely qualified to make in view of its special
knowledge and expertise and its combined statewide responsibility to allocate the rights to, and to control the quality of, state water resources.

The court concluded that the “power to prevent unreasonable methods
of use should be broadly interpreted to enable the Board to strike the
proper balance between the interests in water quality and project activities in order to objectively determine whether a reasonable method of
use is manifested.”
Finally, in something of a sequel to Forni, the Court of Appeal
recently affirmed the SWRCB’s power to regulate the diversion of water
from the Russian River system—including most of its tributaries and all
hydrologically connected groundwater—to protect coho salmon. The
board determined that simultaneous diversions and pumping by vineyards for frost-prevention purposes were unreasonable because the
aggregate withdrawal of water caused migrating juvenile salmon to
become stranded in the river bed. In Light v. State Water Resources
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Control Board (2014), the court held that the board could include
riparians and pre-1914 appropriators (including those that extract
hydrologically connected groundwater from the river system) within
this regulatory scheme: “That the Board cannot require riparian users
and pre-1914 appropriators to obtain a permit before making reasonable beneficial use of water does not mean the Board cannot prevent
them from making unreasonable use. Any other rule would effectively
read Article X, Section 2 out of the Constitution.”

the reasonable use doctrine and
environmental quality
The California Supreme Court’s most important applications of the reasonable use doctrine following Joslin came in two high-profile cases
that pitted municipal water use against environmental protection. In
Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District
(1980), the court held that environmental advocates may rely on article
X, section 2, to claim that a proposed upstream point of diversion for
water supplied by the CVP to the East Bay Municipal Utility District
was unreasonable because of its adverse effects on water quality, fish
and wildlife, and recreational uses in the lower American River. Three
years later, in its landmark opinion in the Mono Lake litigation, the
court held that the mandate of reasonable use also embraces the public
trust, an ancient doctrine that protects recreational access, boating, fishing, and ecological uses of the state’s navigable waters.
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983), the Supreme
Court ruled that Los Angeles’s long-standing rights to appropriate
water from the streams that supply Mono Lake are subject to the public
trust. Just as the doctrine of reasonable use serves as an inherent limitation on the exercise of all water rights, the court declared that the public
trust doctrine “imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking
and use of the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to
allocate water resources in the public interest, the state is not confined
by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.”
Although Audubon is best known as the case in which the Supreme
Court incorporated the public trust doctrine into California’s water
rights system, it is equally important as a reasonable use decision. First,
the court explained that, although the public trust doctrine and the water
rights laws “developed independently of each other,” its integration of
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the two would bring both under the umbrella of article X, section 2. The
constitutional amendment “establishes state water policy. All uses of
water, including public trust uses, must now conform to the standard of
reasonable use.”
Second, the court recognized that water rights do not exist in isolation
from the broader society and environment. In its earlier reasonable use
decisions, the paramount goal was conservation of scarce water resources
to accommodate new consumptive demands as California’s population
and economy continued to grow. In Audubon, the court built on its
Environmental Defense Fund holding and emphasized that fish, wildlife,
recreation, and other in-stream uses that depend on that same water are
also important societal interests that must be taken into account.
Third, the Audubon court’s articulation of the evolving nature of the
public trust was consonant with its dynamic conception of the doctrine
of reasonable use. Both laws recognize that “the state is not confined by
past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.”
Fourth, this dynamic feature means that water rights are mutable
under both the reasonable use and public trust doctrines. Joslin held
that there “is no property right in an unreasonable use of water” and
that the definition of “what constitutes reasonable water use is dependent upon not only the entire circumstances presented but varies as the
current situation changes.” Audubon embellished these principles,
emphasizing that the law “prevents any party from acquiring a vested
right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust.”

legislative declarations of reasonable use
The legislature also has exercised its constitutional authority under article X, section 2, to declare that certain environmental uses of California’s water resources are reasonable. For example, section 1243 of the
Water Code states that “the use of water for recreation and preservation
and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of
water.” Similarly, the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act provides:
“It is the policy of the State of California that certain rivers which possess extraordinary scenic, recreational, fishery, or wildlife values shall
be preserved in their free-flowing state, together with their immediate
environments, for the benefit and enjoyment of the people of the state.
The Legislature declares that such use of these rivers is the highest and
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most beneficial use and is a reasonable and beneficial use of water
within the meaning of Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution” (Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 5093.50).
More recently, the legislature exercised its reasonable use authority to
enact the Delta Reform Act of 2009, which established a Delta Stewardship Council to formulate a Delta Plan and to oversee actions that may
affect the waters and resources of the Delta ecosystem. The act declares
that waters of the Sacramento–San Joaquin River and Delta system shall
be administered to achieve the “co-equal goals” of “providing a more
reliable water supply for California and protecting, restoring, and
enhancing the Delta ecosystem” (Cal. Water Code §§ 85020, 85054).
The legislature also stated that the “longstanding constitutional principle
of reasonable use and the public trust doctrine shall be the foundation of
state water management policy and are particularly important and applicable to the Delta” (§ 85023).
In California Trout v. SWRCB (1989), the Court of Appeal upheld
the legislature’s authority to make these types of categorical declarations of reasonable use. One of California’s oldest environmental protection statutes directs that the “owner of any dam shall allow sufficient
water at all times to pass through a fishway, or in the absence of a fishway, allow sufficient water to pass over, around or through the dam, to
keep in good condition any fish that may be planted or exist below the
dam” (Fish and Game Code § 5937). The court rejected the claim that
this statute violates article X, section 2. It emphasized that the Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to enact laws in furtherance of
the policy of reasonable use and held that where “various alternative
policy views reasonably might be held whether the use of water is reasonable within the meaning of article X, section 2, the view enacted by
the Legislature is entitled to deference by the judiciary.”

the reasonable use doctrine and water
allocation
Although the SWRCB and the courts have authority under the reasonable use doctrine to reallocate water (out of priority) between water
right holders, and to require consumptive users to provide more water
to environmental uses, the relationship between water rights priorities
and reasonable use continues to raise questions.
In its most recent groundwater rights case, City of Barstow v. Mojave
Water Agency (2000), the California Supreme Court overturned a decision
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Statutory Encouragement of
Efficient Water Use
The legislature has enacted a variety of statutes that are designed to
encourage more efficient use of the state’s waters. For example:
•

•

•

•

•

•

It has declared that the cessation or reduction in the extraction of
groundwater—either as a result of the use of alternative sources
or to allow for the replenishment of the aquifer—is a reasonable
and beneficial use (Water Code §§ 1005.1–1005.4).
It has stated that the cessation or reduction in the use of water
made possible by the substitution of recycled, desalinated,
or treated polluted water is a reasonable beneficial use
(§§ 1010(a)).
It has mandated similar treatment for cessations or reductions in
water use because of conservation or the use of groundwater that
is managed as part of a conjunctive use program (§§ 1011(a),
1011.5(a)).
It has authorized the transfer of water that is made available by
conservation or the substitution of these alternative sources and
has guaranteed that the transferor’s rights to the transferred water
will be protected and preserved during the term of the transfer
agreement (§§ 1010(b), 1011(b), 1011.5(b), 1014–1017).
It has required municipal water agencies to meter and report on
water use, and it has required agricultural supply agencies to
monitor and report on groundwater levels (§§ 500–535, 10920–
10936).
It has authorized counties and local agencies to conjunctively
manage surface and groundwater supplies and has required urban
and agricultural water agencies to adopt best management
practices to promote conservation and efficient use (§§ 10608–
10608.64, 10610–10656, 10750–10783.2, 10800–10853).

The legislature also has granted public water agencies authority to
use “allocation-based conservation water pricing”—i.e., tiered water
pricing—which it identified as “one effective means by which waste or
unreasonable use of water can be prevented and water can be saved in
the interest of the people and for the public welfare, within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution”
(§§ 370–374).
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that “equitably apportioned” the safe yield of an overdrafted groundwater
basin among all water right holders regardless of the type or priority of
water right. “We have never,” the court stated, “endorsed a pure equitable
apportionment that completely disregards overlying owners’ existing legal
rights.”
Yet, the court also rejected the view that priority of water right alone
should determine which users should curtail their pumping and which
may continue. It confirmed the broad holding of Joslin that article X,
section 2, “dictates the basic principles defining water rights: that no
one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water, and
that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially.”
Although “water right priority has long been the central principle in California water law, . . . the corollary of this rule is that an equitable physical
solution must preserve water right priorities to the extent those priorities
do not lead to unreasonable use.” In crafting a “physical solution” to the
problem of aggregate overdraft, the court concluded, a trial court “may
neither change priorities among the water rights holders nor eliminate
vested rights in applying the solution without first considering them in
relation to the reasonable use doctrine” (emphasis added).
The two other courts that have confronted this question of the relationship between water rights priorities and reasonable use have followed
this approach. In El Dorado Irrigation District v. State Water Resources
Control Board (2006), the Court of Appeal overturned a decision by the
board that required all permittees and licensees in the Sacramento River
basin to cease diversions whenever the CVP or SWP are releasing stored
water to meet Delta water quality standards—regardless of the appropriator’s priority vis-à-vis the two projects. The court explained that
“sometimes the use of water under a claim of prior right must yield to the
need to preserve water quality to protect public trust interests, and continued use under those circumstances may be deemed unreasonable.” If,
for example, “El Dorado’s diversions of natural flow contribute to the
degradation of water quality in the Delta, the Board has a legitimate
interest in requiring [the district] to reduce its diversions to contribute
toward the maintenance and improvement of water quality in the Delta.”
The court cautioned, however, that the board must respect the relative water rights priorities:
When the Board seeks to ensure that water quality objectives are met in order
to enforce the rule against unreasonable use and the public trust doctrine, the
Board must attempt to preserve water right priorities to the extent those priorities do not lead to unreasonable use or violation of public trust values. In
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other words, in such circumstances the subversion of a water right priority is
justified only if enforcing that priority will in fact lead to the unreasonable
use of water or result in harm to values protected by the public trust.

The Court of Appeal also recently grappled with the question of priority of water rights in the context of the Russian River adjudication. It
acknowledged that when “the supply of water is insufficient to satisfy
all persons and entities holding water rights, it is ordinarily the function
of the rule of priority to determine the degree to which any particular
use must be curtailed. Yet even in these circumstances, the Board has the
ultimate authority to allocate water in a manner inconsistent with the
rule of priority, when doing so is necessary to prevent the unreasonable
use of water” (Light v. SWRCB, 2014). This is especially true, the court
stated, when the board is acting to protect the public trust. It added,
quoting El Dorado, that because “‘no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water’ . . . when the rule of priority
clashes with the rule against unreasonable use of water, the latter must
prevail.”
These cases add an important caveat to the law of reasonable use.
Although all water rights are defined by reasonable use and must be
exercised reasonably in light of contemporary conditions and standards,
the doctrine does not apply carte blanche. Aggregate unreasonable use
(such as groundwater overdraft or harm to water quality or fisheries)
does not necessarily mean that every water user is acting unreasonably.
Nor does it mean that the SWRCB and the courts may necessarily require
pro rata reductions in water use or impose equal conditions on all water
users regardless of their relative priority of right. While the reasonable
use doctrine grants the board and the courts broad powers to correct the
overall problem, the remedies applied to each water user must be more
nuanced. The trier of fact must make individualized determinations of
reasonable use and must be guided by the rule of priority. As all three of
these cases make clear, the SWRCB and the courts may depart from the
underlying water rights priorities only if they justify their decisions on
findings of individual unreasonable use vis-à-vis the other potentially
affected water right holders. The reasonable use doctrine is powerful, but
it is not a magic wand.

the future of reasonable use
Although there is no single response to the challenges of California water
management in the twenty-first century, the reasonable use doctrine will
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play an important role in helping to effectuate a variety of necessary
improvements in California water policy.
Prevention of Waste and Improvements in
the Efficiency of Water Use
The state has estimated that available improvements in the efficiency of
water use could conserve between 180,000 and 1.1 million acre-feet per
year in the agricultural sector and 1.2 million to 2.1 million acre-feet per
year currently used for municipal and industrial purposes (California
Bay-Delta Authority 2005). Although this analysis probably underestimates the statewide water conservation potential, it does suggest that
many water-use practices may be unreasonable in light of the existing
strains on the state’s developed water supplies and the future diminution
in useable supplies that is a predicted consequence of climate change.
The state—acting principally through the SWRCB or the courts—has
authority to investigate individual cases of unreasonable use and to
declare unreasonable a variety of water practices that may have been
acceptable in the past, but which are no longer tolerable in the face of
contemporary and future water supply challenges. These may include
excessive evaporative and conveyance losses, inefficient irrigation techniques, failure to adopt or to implement best management practices,
and perhaps other profligate uses such as the irrigation of water-intensive crops and landscaping. Future unreasonable use also may include
excessive reliance on imported water instead of shifting to a more varied water portfolio that incudes cost-effective alternatives such as
demand reduction, use of recharged groundwater, and recycling of
reclaimed wastewater.
The Delta Watermaster has issued a report to the SWRCB and the
Delta Stewardship Council advocating greater enforcement of the reasonable use doctrine to address wasteful water practices and to create
incentives to achieve more efficient water use (Wilson 2010). “The
underlying premise of this report,” he stated, “is that the inefficient use
of water is an unreasonable use of water.” The Watermaster then provided examples of a variety of currently available agricultural water
management practices that could be required to promote the reasonable
use of water, including “weather-based and deficit irrigation scheduling,
water distribution systems that can supply water to farmers ‘on-demand,’
and improved irrigation methods, such as substituting drip and sprinkler irrigation for flood irrigation.”
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The report provides a template for focused and proactive application
of the reasonable use doctrine to promote greater efficiency in water
use. Although the report addressed only agricultural water practices,
there is a significant role for reasonable use investigations of water use
in California’s urban and suburban areas as well. There exists the potential for significant water savings, especially in irrigation of landscaping
and other outdoor uses (Hanak et al. 2011, 171–73).
Regional Water Management, Water Pricing,
and Water Use Efficiency
In the Delta Reform Act of 2009, the legislature declared a state policy
“to reduce reliance on the Delta in meeting California’s future water
supply needs through a statewide strategy of investing in improved
regional supplies, conservation, and water use efficiency” (Cal. Water
Code § 85021). It then directed that “each region that depends on water
from the Delta watershed shall improve its regional self-reliance for
water through investment in water use efficiency, water recycling,
advanced water technologies, local and regional water supply projects,
and improved regional coordination of local and regional water supply
efforts.” A variety of statutes empower local and regional agencies to
promote greater efficiency in water use. These include the requirements
that municipal water agencies meter and report on water use (Cal.
Water Code §§ 500–535), that agricultural water agencies monitor and
report on groundwater levels (§§ 10920–10936), and that agencies
adopt urban and agricultural water management plans that include best
practices to promote conservation and efficient use (§§ 10608–
10608.64, 10610–10656, 10750–10783.2, 10800–10853). The legislature also has authorized (with voter approval) more than $2 billion in
bond funding to support forty-six integrated regional water management programs that allow cities, counties, and other agencies to coordinate their water supply, water management, and flood control efforts
(Hanak et al. 2011, 365–68). All of these laws build on the constitutional mandate that California’s water resources be administered to
promote reasonable, and reasonably efficient, water use.
Water pricing also plays an important role in encouraging reasonable
use. The legislature has authorized public water agencies to adopt “allocation-based conservation water pricing” (Cal. Water Code §§ 370–
374). The agency may set a base rate that is designed to cover its fixed
costs and then one or more higher rates that increase with volume of
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water use. Tiered rate structures create incentives for conservation and
more efficient use, because the cost per unit of water rises as each customer’s demands increase (Hanak et al. 2011, 270–73). Agencies with
allocation-based tiers typically use revenues from the upper tiers to fund
conservation programs within their service area. Since the legislature’s
express authorization of allocation-based conservation pricing in 2008,
a number of water supply agencies have adopted tiered rates (Hanak et
al. 2011, 270–73).
Although enacted pursuant to article X, section 2, tiered rate pricing
has raised questions under article XIIID of the California Constitution,
which was passed by the voters in 1996 as Proposition 218. This law
provides inter alia that water rates “shall not exceed the proportional
cost of the service” attributable to each parcel of land that receives
water service (Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 6(b)(3)).
In City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water District (2011), the California
Court of Appeal invalidated a tiered-rate structure that set different
rates (and different percentage increases between tiers) for residential,
commercial, and irrigation customers. The court recognized that the
district had adopted the tiered rates for the purpose of encouraging
conservation and efficient use, consistent with the constitutional reasonable use mandate as well as the legislature’s authorization of allocationbased conservation pricing. It explained, however, that “article X, section 2 is not at odds with Article IIID so long as . . . conservation is
attained in a manner that ‘shall not exceed the proportional cost of the
service attributable to the parcel.’” The court concluded that the district
had not explained “why [these other laws] cannot be harmonized with
Proposition 218 and its mandate for proportionality. PWD [Palmdale
Water District] fails to identify any support in the record for the inequality between tiers, depending on the category of user.”
The court’s insistence on a cost-based justification of water rates and
rate differentials may well be required by Proposition 218, but overly
strict judicial interpretations of the law will present challenges for contemporary water administration. Allocation-based conservation pricing
is one of the most direct and proactive means of implementing article X,
section 2’s goals of conservation and efficient use. It accomplishes these
goals through price incentives, rather than government fiat; and it fairly
distributes the costs of water service by requiring those who use the
most to pay the most. The question in these types of cases should not be
how to ensure that article X, section 2, “is not at odds with” Proposition
218, but how to ensure that the ratemaking strictures of Proposition 218
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do not undermine the most important principles of California water law
and policy (Gray et al. 2014).
Integrated Management of Groundwater and
Surface Water Resources
One of the most vexing problems in California water law is the antiquated separation between the law of surface water rights and the law
governing groundwater (Sax 2003; Hanak et al. 2011, 322–28).
Although there is now integrated management of surface and groundwater resources in twenty-two adjudicated groundwater basins and special groundwater management districts, many problems remain (see
chapter 8 in this volume).
The most logical and direct response to these problems would be for
the legislature to enact a statute empowering the SWRCB to exercise
integrated permitting and regulatory authority over surface and groundwater rights. There is no question of the legislature’s power to do this
under article X, section 2. With limited exceptions, however, it is unlikely
to occur.6
Yet, the courts have their own constitutional reasonable use authority
to address problems of groundwater overdraft and conflict between surface and groundwater uses. For example, the physical solution and final
judgment in the Mojave adjudication included rights to both groundwater
and surface water, based on the trial court’s determination that the two
are hydrologically connected: diversions from the river reduce groundwater recharge, and groundwater pumping reduces the volume and flow of
water in the river. Indeed, the water management system that the judgment created places a water replacement charge on all water extraction
that exceeds each user’s “free production allowance.” The revenues from
these charges are used to fund the acquisition of imported surface water
to augment and replenish the native groundwater supplies (Littleworth
and Garner 2007).
This integrated management of surface water and groundwater supplies established an important precedent: that the courts have authority
under article X, section 2, to unify the law of surface and groundwater
rights situationally where unintegrated management and regulation would
result in unreasonable use. And the courts have this constitutional power
despite the general legal distinction between the surface water and groundwater systems. Indeed, as a result of earlier groundwater adjudications
and special legislation, integrated surface and groundwater management is
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now an important feature of regional water administration in several parts
of California. These include the Orange County Water District, the Water
Replenishment District of Southern California, the Santa Clara Valley
Water Agency, and a number of smaller districts that manage adjudicated
groundwater basins (Blomquist 1992).
The SWRCB’s assertion of its article X, section 2, authority to limit
surface water diversions and groundwater withdrawals from the Russian River system to protect coho salmon is another example of how the
reasonable use doctrine can facilitate integrated water management. If
the board were confined to its direct authority over surface water permittees and licensees, its efforts to protect the salmon would be frustrated. Not only would riparians and groundwater right holders be
exempt, but those appropriators who are subject to the regulation could
simply shift from surface water diversions to groundwater pumping and
evade the restrictions. The aggregate effect would be to place an already
endangered species in further jeopardy of extinction, which would
unquestionably be an unreasonable exercise of water rights. As the
Court of Appeal recognized in Light v. SWRCB, integrated surface and
groundwater regulation in this context is therefore an appropriate and
necessary exercise of the SWRCB’s reasonable use powers.7
Incentives for Water Conservation and Transfer
Many of the important reasonable use cases have involved reallocations
of water from senior water right holders whose existing uses or methods
of use had become unreasonable in light of new consumptive demands
on the resource or new environmental requirements. The courts in these
cases have consistently held that an unreasonable use of water—unreasonable under contemporary standards—may not be asserted to block
the new use or to obtain compensation from the new user. Although
these principles are a sine qua non of reasonable use, some water users,
economists, and policymakers have criticized the doctrine for rendering
water rights uncertain. This uncertainty is harmful, they argue, because
it may deter investment and marketability: “If current owners of water
rights do not have secure rights—even if the lack of security serves perfectly valid public purposes—they will have a difficult time finding buyers for those rights” (Haddad 2000, 41).
Properly administered, however, the reasonable use doctrine can place
constructive pressure on existing water users not to waste water and to
encourage the profitable transfer of water from potentially unreasonable

The Reasonable Use Doctrine

| 99

uses. Indeed, California’s two most prominent water transfers resulted
from this interplay between reasonable use and the market.
As described above, in 1984 the SWRCB made a determination of
unreasonable use against the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), finding
that the district’s unlined canals and lack of regulating reservoirs in its
water distribution system were causing both waste of water and flooding of land adjacent to the Salton Sea. The board ordered the district to
correct these problems and to conserve a minimum of 100,000 acre-feet
per year. With its water rights in jeopardy of reduction, the district
agreed to line its canals, construct regulating reservoirs, and make operational improvements to its distribution system. These conservation
actions would be funded, however, by the Metropolitan Water District
(MWD) as payment for a 35-year transfer of 106,110 acre-feet per year
from the IID to the MWD (Gray 1994). The SWRCB could have simply
divested the IID of its water rights to the extent of unreasonable use, but
it chose not to do so in favor of the more constructive solution presented in the IID–MWD transfer.8
The waste and unreasonable-use laws also served as a catalyst for a
subsequent transfer of conserved water from IID to the San Diego
County Water Authority. Following years of focus on California’s
excessive use of water from the Colorado River, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation made a formal finding that farmers within the IID were wasting water. Based on this finding, the bureau determined that the district
was in violation of the beneficial use requirement of federal reclamation
law, which includes a reasonable use standard, and it ordered a reduction in water deliveries to the IID of approximately 8 percent. This decision broke a decade-long deadlock in negotiations among the Department of the Interior, the IID, the MWD, and the SDCWA. Two months
later, the Southern California water agencies pledged to reduce their use
of Colorado River water by 800,000 acre-feet per year over the next 14
years. This Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA) brought California into compliance with the 4.4 million acre-feet per year limit of
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, which governs the allocation of Colorado River water among Arizona, California, and Nevada. In the QSA,
IID also agreed to conserve and transfer 277,000 acre-feet per year to
SDCWA for a period of 35 years (Gray 2005).9
The IID transfers were the product of the state and federal governments’ enforcement of the mandate of reasonable use. The SWRCB and
the Department of the Interior applied the doctrine of reasonable use
aggressively, but also flexibly, to give IID and its members a choice:
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forfeit their water rights to the extent of unreasonable use, or correct
the problem and benefit economically from the conservation and transfer of their previously wasteful practices. Application of the reasonable
use doctrine in this context thus served three salutary purposes. It
induced the conservation and more efficient conveyance and use of
water within IID. It led to the transfer of the conserved water to highervalued uses within MWD and SDCWA. And it reduced MWD’s and
SDCWA’s long-term demands for water from both the Colorado River
and other sources (such as the Delta or new water projects in the Sierra
Nevada).
One of the goals of the modern water transfer statutes is to create
economic incentives for water right holders and their derivative users to
conserve water and to transfer that water to higher-valued uses by presenting them with the opportunity costs of their existing uses—that is,
by showing them that they may earn more revenue from selling water
than they can through their own uses. Enforcement of the reasonable
use mandate to induce these types of transfers is an important means of
effectuating these statutory policies and should become a more prominent feature of California’s efforts to foster greater efficiency in water
use and water allocation. The two IID transfers are a model for this
vital synergy between water transfers and reasonable use.
Compliance with Environmental Standards and
Protection of the Public Trust
The reasonable use doctrine also serves the important purpose of helping to implement and enforce the public trust and the other environmental laws that protect water quality, endangered species, aquatic
habitat, and other in situ uses. These laws establish fundamental limitations on the amount of water that water right holders may impound
and divert from California’s rivers, lakes, and estuaries.
Federal statutes, such as the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et
seq.) and the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.), are
preemptive of California water rights law, as are the water quality
standards, biological opinions, and other regulations and administrative actions that implement them. California’s environmental laws also
take precedence over water rights in the event of conflict. The environmental baselines these laws establish define the quantity of water available for impoundment and diversion (In re Bay-Delta Programmatic
Environmental Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 2008).
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Yet, some courts have struggled to understand the relationship
between environmental mandates and the reasonable use doctrine as a
limit on the exercise of water rights. For example, in Tulare Lake Water
Storage District v. United States (2001), the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims ruled that restrictions on SWP operations required by biological
opinions issued under the federal Endangered Species Act to protect
winter-run Chinook salmon and Delta smelt were a taking of property,
because the operational constraints caused water shortages for some
SWP contractors. The court ordered the United States to pay the contractors approximately $26 million in damages. Although the court
noted that the reasonable use and public trust doctrines might preclude
the appropriation of water under conditions that would imperil endangered species of fish, it declined to consider either aspect of California
water rights law as part of its analysis.
Similarly, in Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States (2008),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the United
States’s directive that a local water district allow water to pass through
a fish ladder was a taking of property. The releases of water were needed
to support migration of steelhead, which are also protected under the
federal ESA. The court reasoned that the federal government had physically diverted the plaintiff’s water for its own purposes—protection of
the endangered fish. The court never addressed the question of whether
California’s reasonable use and public trust doctrines might limit the
plaintiff ’s exercise of its water rights in a manner that could harm the
protected fish.10
Yet, analysis of the reasonable use doctrine in these settings should be
straightforward, both for the advocates of environmental protection and
for the courts. Article X, section 2, declares as a matter of California
constitutional and property rights law that existing uses of water are
unlawful if they cause unreasonable harm to water quality, fish, aquatic
ecosystems, or other in-stream beneficial uses. Not only does the state
have a duty to enforce the reasonable use mandate, but it may do so
without violating the water rights of those users who must reduce their
impoundment and diversion of water, limit discharges, or otherwise alter
their water use practices to comply with this supervening law. As Joslin
and its progeny make clear, because there is no valid property right in an
unreasonable use, when the state acts to abate water practices that unreasonably harm the environment it may do so without compensation.
Although an adjudicatory reasonable use determination always
requires an assessment of the competing interests, it is difficult to
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imagine a case in which a court would find reasonable a use of water
that violates water quality standards or jeopardizes the continued existence of endangered or threatened species. As described above, the California Court of Appeal has held that statutes that allocate water to
environmental uses, or which place limits on the impoundment and
diversion of water to protect against environmental harm, are presumptively reasonable and are entitled to significant deference (California
Trout v. SWRCB, 1989). Conversely, uses of water that violate state
and federal environmental laws—or the water quality and streamflow
standards, effluent limits, biological opinions, incidental take limits,
and other regulations that implement those laws—should be presumptively unreasonable and a substantial burden placed on the water right
holder to prove otherwise.
Constructive Pressure to Reform
The reasonable use doctrine will continue to be a vital component of
California water policy. It is the foundation of the state’s water rights
system and applies to all water rights. It confers authority on all branches
and levels of government to ensure that water is used reasonably (and
reasonably efficiently) to maximize the general welfare of Californians.
This includes drinking-water supplies and economic uses, as well as the
environment. The reasonable use doctrine (sometimes working in tandem with the public trust) therefore serves to ensure that the impoundment and diversion of the state’s waters for consumptive uses do not
degrade aquatic ecosystems or harm the aquatic and terrestrial species
that also depend on these waters.
Some future applications of the reasonable use mandate will be obvious. As discussed in the preceding subsection, assertion of the doctrine
both to protect endangered fish and to limit the exercise of water rights
that threaten to jeopardize such species is one example. Another obvious (and perhaps easy) application of the reasonable use mandate would
be to restrict the groundwater pumping on the west side of the San
Joaquin Valley that has caused overdraft and compaction of local aquifers, with attendant land subsidence of almost 30 feet. This overdraft
and subsidence now threaten the geologic stability and flow capabilities
of the Delta-Mendota Canal and the California Aqueduct, which deliver
irrigation water to approximately 3 million acres of farmland in the San
Joaquin Valley and Tulare Basin and to more than 16 million residential, commercial, and industrial customers in Southern California (U.S.
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Geological Survey 2013). This is a compelling example of the state’s
obligation to enforce the doctrine of reasonable use for the benefit of
California’s people and economy.
In less egregious situations, the reasonable use doctrine is likely to
play a more indirect role in improving water management and water
use. The Delta Watermaster’s call for an investigation of irrigation practices is an excellent beginning. Coupled with the statutes that protect
existing users’ rights to conserved water and allow them to transfer water
made available through voluntary conservation, such investigations
could induce some farmers and irrigation-water managers to correct
wasteful practices and perhaps even profit from their reforms. Presented
with both the opportunity costs of their existing uses and the threat of
loss of water rights for failure to act, these users may choose to do the
right thing. The two IID transfers of conserved water are useful templates
for this type of interplay between reasonable use and market incentives.
Moreover, some environmental groups have suggested that the state
should assert its reasonable use authority against those who irrigate
water-intensive crops, such as alfalfa and pasture (Natural Resources
Defense Council 1996). The doctrine also could be used to put pressure
on municipal water agencies and their customers to minimize their use
of water for landscaping and other outdoor uses. Whether state and
local regulators would have the will to take such actions is an open
question. As the foregoing demonstrates, however, the reasonable use
mandates clearly apply to uses that demand an inordinate share of the
available water in light of contemporary competing demands. It should
not matter in this context whether the excessive demands are the result
of an unreasonable point of diversion, method of conveyance, or place
of use, or are caused by the type of use to which the water is put.
The doctrine of reasonable use may therefore be best understood as
a source of pressure on all water users to exercise their rights in a manner that accounts for the effects of their water-use practices on other
existing and potential uses—both consumptive and environmental—
and that keeps pace with the times. Although the law may not necessarily require that individual water uses be as efficient as technology permits, or that water uses be changed to ensure optimal allocation
(however that might be determined), the doctrine does set an enforceable standard of reasonably efficient use and reasonably efficient allocation as current conditions warrant. A consistent and palpable threat of
regulatory enforcement of reasonable use may serve as a constructive
inducement to better water use and more optimal allocation.
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conclusion
Toward the end of his life, Wallace Stegner looked back over a century
of water resources policy and wrote: “The West cannot carry what it
has lifted. It will make heroic efforts, always in the direction of more
grandiose engineering works, and in the end it will subside back to what
it was meant to be, an oasis civilization with one great deficiency—
water.” We need, he concluded, “a Redeemer” (Stegner 1986).
The twin problems that Stegner identified—overdevelopment of an
arid environment and an unrequited faith that we can somehow engineer
a solution to water scarcity—are even more palpable 30 years on. Yet, as
Stegner knew full well, there will be no redeemer. There is only our capacity to learn from the past, to repair the problems that we have created,
and to place ourselves on a more sustainable future path. As California
moves forward in the twenty-first century to confront the challenges
posed by overuse and misallocation, groundwater overdraft, ecological
degradation, continued population growth, and the predicted effects of
global warming and climate change, the responsive and dynamic mandates of the reasonable use doctrine will be an essential guide.

notes
1. The common law, statutory law, and constitutional law of water rights
also contain a “beneficial use” requirement, which means that all uses of water
must be for a socially beneficial use (Cal. Const. art. X, § 2; Cal. Water Code §
1240). This chapter focuses on the reasonable use requirement because, both as
a water policy directive and as a limitation on water rights, it is the more significant of the two.
2. Although the doctrine of reasonable use was part of the common law of
riparian and appropriative rights, the voters placed it in the Constitution in
1928 to overturn a series of California Supreme Court decisions that prevented
appropriators from alleging unreasonable use against riparians. The consequence was to allow riparians to enjoin any nonriparian use of water that
diminished the natural flow of California’s rivers, regardless of the unreasonableness of the riparian’s claims. This in turn threatened the development of the
state’s economy, which was increasingly dependent on water exported from the
Sierra Nevada to the Bay Area, the Tulare Basin, and Southern California (Gray
1989; Hundley 2001).
3. In City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000), the Supreme Court
suggested that this same principle may apply to unexercised groundwater rights
held by property owners whose lands overlie the aquifer (and hence have first
priority to its safe yield).
4. The court relied in both cases on the Water Code, § 1050, which declares
that the SWRCB’s regulatory authority is “in furtherance of the policy con-
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tained in Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution and in all respects
for the welfare and benefit of the people of the state, for the improvement of
their prosperity and their living conditions.”
5. This transfer, as well as the interplay between the reasonable use doctrine
and water transfers, will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
6. The legislature has granted the board authority to engage in integrated
surface and groundwater rights administration in the Scott River system, where
the board has the power to conduct a statutory adjudication of all water rights,
including “ground water supplies which are interconnected with the Scott
River” (Cal. Water Code § 2500.5).
In September 2014, California governor Jerry Brown signed into law three
bills that empower local agencies to regulate groundwater pumping: AB 1739,
SB 1168, and SB 1319. The legislation also authorizes the SWRCB to regulate
groundwater pumping if the board determines that (1) the local groundwater
sustainability plan is inadequate and “is not being implemented in a manner
that will likely achieve the sustainability goal,” and (2) “the basin is in a condition where groundwater extractions result in significant depletions of interconnected surface waters” (Cal. Water Code § 10735.2(a)(5)(B)(i), (ii)). The new
law stipulates that before January 1, 2025, however, “the state board shall not
establish an interim plan under this section to remedy a condition where the
groundwater extractions result in significant depletions of interconnected surface waters” (§ 10735.8(h)). Although this legislation is an important first step
toward integrated regulation of ground and surface water resources, it does not
alter the long-standing general legal divide between the two.
7. In May 2014, a Superior Court applied this reasoning to hold that the
public trust doctrine may limit groundwater pumping that lowers surface flows
in the Scott River and thereby harms fish and recreational uses (Environmental
Law Foundation v. SWRCB, 2014). This decision is consonant with the integrative and comprehensive interpretation of article X, section 2, described in the
text.
8. The board’s forbearance of its power to divest the IID of a portion of its
water rights was supported by the legislature’s general declaration that water
conservation, as well as the transfer of conserved water, is a reasonable and
beneficial use (Water Code §§ 1011(a), (b)). The legislature also enacted a special law to protect the IID against forfeiture or diminution of its water rights as
a result of water conservation and to insulate the district from liability for any
adverse effects on the Salton Sea that might result (§§ 1012, 1013(a)).
9. As with the IID–MWD transfer, the legislature enacted special legislation
to facilitate the IID–SDCWA transfer (Cal. Water Code § 1013(b)–(h)).
10. In a later opinion in the case, the Federal Circuit came closer to the reasonable use question, recognizing that article X, section 2, defines the property right
in water. It held that because Casitas had not proved that the loss of the water that
the government required to pass though the fish ladder had reduced the amount
that the district could apply to beneficial use, the district had failed to establish an
interference with its water rights. Under California law, the court concluded, “the
concept of beneficial use provides an ‘overriding constitutional limitation’ on a
party’s water rights” (Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 2013).
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